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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
most authorities advocate that the expert witness be permitted to give
his opinion without the use of a hypothetical question.1 9 It is their con-
tention that cross-examination could be successfully employed to bring
out the exact facts upon which the opinion is based, and that therefore
there is no need for posing a time-consuming hypothetical question as
a preliminary to the opinion.
As for the rule excluding evidence which the court deems as usurp-
ing the province of the jury, it seems unreasonable that the admissibility
of expert opinion should be dependent on any such meritless and nebu-
lous standard. As pointed out in a previous case comment in this
REVIEW :20 "Evidence of the very point in issue would seem to be of the
highest pertinency. Thus a strict application of the rule leads to the
absurd result that admissibility varies in inverse proportion to rel-
evancy". This policy is often defended in that it is said to be necessary
to prevent the jury from giving unmerited weight to such an opinion
instead of giving the question that independent consideration to which
a party is entitled in a jury trial. However, this argument is difficult
to follow for, by hypothesis, the subject is one with which the jury is in-
capable of dealing. It is submitted that a more productive approach
would be simply to ask whether, under the circumstances of the case,
the opinion would aid the jury in arriving at a sound decision.
E. W. COLE, JR.
Labor Law-Applicability of Anti-Racketeering Act to
Certain Practices of Labor Unions
Convicted under the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act,1 defendant, a
truck drivers' union in New York City, appealed to the federal circuit
court. Evidence was that the union sought to control all hauling in
New York City; that it posted members on the edge of the city, who
attempted to commandeer incoming trucks, drive them within the city,
and do any necessary loading and unloading; that various breaches of
the peace and acts of violence resulted when the truck operators re-
sisted the labor unions; that in most cases the union men exacted up
to $9.42 (a day's wages) from each incoming truck, regardless of the
length of time involved in driving or "standing by" ;2 and that the union
192 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §686; RESTATEMENT, 'CODE OF Evi-
DENcE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §509; Tentative Draft of Model Expert Testi-
mo ny Act, 11.
"0 Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. REv. 180.
'48 Stat. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp., 1940).
'As the name implies, a stand-by is a local union member who is present at
a particular job-site and is paid a full salary, because of pressure exerted on
the employer by a labor union, but who does practically no work, due to the
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members probably would have done any and all the truck driving if
given a chance to. Held, that a logical and prudent interpretation of
the clause of the Anti-Racketeering Act which reads, "not including,
however, the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide
employee", and also an examination of the legislative history of the
statute, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended thereby to exempt
labor disputes generally from the purview of the Act; and, this being a
labor dispute, defendant is not guilty of the violation charged, even
though its conduct is very questionable.3
This case is by no means unique. Various contemporary writers
have gathered an alarming number of examples of "rackets" being
operated by labor unions. In most such cases force and violence are not
used, so that these unions are not subject to attack by injunction under
the Federal Anti-Injunction Act.4 Practically every exhibit at the
New York World's Fair was forced to pay tribute to the local unions
in the form of hiring stand-bys. Stand-bys had to be hired even for
extremely technical jobs which none of the local men possibly could
have done. Several workers sent as stand-bys for some noted mural
painters, turned out to be only house painters when unexpectedly asked
to do some work.5 Painters' unions in various sections of our country
forbid the use of spray guns-'handbrush painting increases the time in-
volved, and so proportionately the cost. 6 Because the local builders'
unions refuse to work with prefabricated materials, FHA records reveal
that, instead of more positions being created for carpenters, plumbers,
masons, and laborers, the number of homes constructed in Cleveland,
Ohio, for example, is greatly reduced.7 Chicago grocers, wishing to
pass on to the public the savings in delivery charges of cash-and-carry
milk, were prevented from so 'doing by the local milk-wagon drivers'
union. 8 In various parts of the country, union men will not work
under the direct supervision of the person having the work done, but
will force the hiring of many unneeded supervisors and "straw bosses".9
Such examples could be cited almost ad infinitum, but it will suffice
to say that because of the very union under indictment in the principal
case, it costs $112.00 more to distribute a load of vegetables in New
fact that the employer uses his own previously employed workers even though
he has to pay. double for so doing.3 United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America, 118 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941). Contra: Nick et al. v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941).
'47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §101-115 (Supp., 1940).
'Stanley High, Labor it the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
'Thurman Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
'William Hard, Labor and National Unity, Reader's Digest, Nov., 1939.
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York than in other comparable cities. A farmer bringing in his own
produce on -his own truck must hire one of the stand-bys as the price
of unloading the truck.' 0
It is believed that the problem thus seen to exist is not adequately
dealt with by any of the existing labor acts, or any other federal statutes,
unless it is the Anti-Racketeering Act. A survey of the most important
labor legislation shows that in the last decade Congress has without
exception been affording increased powers and protection to labor. First,
the Norris-LaGuardia, or Federal Anti-Injunction Act outlawed the
"yellow dog" contract, thus eliminating the practice followed by many
employers of hiring only those workers who would sign a contract not
to join a union or engage in union activities; and also prevented the
abuse of the strike injunction by prohibiting the enjoining of peaceful
picketing, and strike practices not accompanied by force or violence.
Second, the Wagner, or National Labor Relations Act" guaranteed
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, provided
machinery for protection against unfair labor .practices of employers,
and provided that no employer could refuse to bargain collectively with
a bargaining unit for labor selected under the provisions of the Act.
Third, the Fair Labor Standards, or Wages and Hours Act 12 pro-
vides that wages shall be kept above a certain minimum; that hours
shall in the main be kept below a certain maximum, or that "time-and-a-
half" shall be paid for overtime; that no employee shall be discrimi-
nated against by his employer for seeking his rights under the Act; and
that the courts may enforce the Act by injunction.
None of these acts would seem to deal with the conduct of the
New York truckers' union, and other racketeering unions, except in
the cases where these unions resort to outright violence, which can be
enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
It seems conceivable that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 18 which
outlaws combinations in restraint of trade and imposes a penalty of treble
damages upon violators of the act, would be an effective weapon for
eliminating these insidious union activities. But in the recent Apex
Hosiery case,' 4 the United States Supreme Court held that labor dis-
putes are not violative of the Sherman Act unless their purpose is to
affect prices or otherwise to destroy free commercial competition in the
open market. This Act is thus obviously emasculated insofar as the
problem under discussion is concerned.
1 Thurman Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.
"49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.. C. A. §§151-156 (Supp. 1940).
12 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§201-219 (Supp. 1940).
1-26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§1-7 (1941).
"' Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. ed.
1311 (1940).
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Obviously the Department of Justice is in need of some weapon
capable of controlling those unions, which, though not using violence,
nevertheless are victimizing the consumer and the public. But for the
present decision, an ideal weapon might be found in the Anti-Racketeer-
ing Act, which provides that one who, acting so as to affect trade
or commerce, obtains or attemptt to obtain money or valuable con-
siderations or property belonging to another with his consent, if such
consent is induced by wrongful use of force or fear or threats, is guilty
of a felony. It is submitted that labor unions are just as capable of ex-
tortion and racketeering as any other group, and that there is no sound
reason or doctrine that should exclude them from conviction under the
Anti-Racketeering Act when it is proved beyond reasonable doubt in
open court that they are engaging in these practices.
In the first place, it could be urged on good authority that the
instant situation in New York did not involve simply "the payment of
wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee", as was held
in the principle case. Unless the hirer has the right to discharge,
then the worker cannot be considered an "employee". 15 That term
means a person employed to labor for the pleasure or interest of another,
or one employed to render service or assistance in some trade or voca-
tion; one whom the employer retains the right to direct not only as to
what shall be done, but how it shall be done ;16 and one whom the em-
ployer has the right to hire, and discharge even short of the completion
of the work. 7 (This is of course subject to the provisions of the
NLRA, that an employer cannot make union activity on the part of a
worker the basis for discharging him, or for refusing to hire him in the
first place.) 8 Furthermore, it has been held that workers who are
guilty of acts of violence against the interests of their employers cannot
be considered as employees either for the purpose of securing rein-
statement by the NLRB, or of being considered as members of the
union for the purpose of collective bargaining. 19 It is submitted that
in the light of these holdings the members of the New York truckers'
union cannot be considered as "bona fide employees" of the truck
SLillibridge v. Industrial Accident Com., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 237, 40 P. (2d)
856 (1935); Bernal v. Star Chronicle Pub. Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 429 (Mo. 1935);
Mitchell v. Maytag-Pacific-Intermountain Co., 184 Wash. 342, 51 P. (2d) 393
(1935); RESTATEMENT, AGENcY (1933) §221.
" Simmons v. Kansas City Jockey Club, 334 Mo. 99, 66 S. W. (2d) 119(1933).
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 66 S. W. (2d) 787 (Tex. 1933).
's Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 61 Sup. Ct. 845,
85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 753 (1941) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937); Asso-
dated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650,
81 L. ed. 953 (1936).
"' Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 97 F. (2d)
531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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owners. It is a strange law that would compel a businessman to accept
as his employee and the operator of his expensive machinery and equip-
ment those who have used malicious coercion in foisting themselves
upon him.
A second point is that there is a growing tendency in modern
judicial thought to construe criminal statutes in a manner consistent
with the intent of the legislature, and most conducive to social protec-
tion, rather than to follow the old hornbook rule that a criminal statute
is to be construed strictly and in the light most favorable to the accused.20
Social protection certainly seems to demand the conviction of the
truckers' union here. Channels of transportation would be totally ob-
structed if truckers' unions in every town took similar liberties, for a
trucking concern would be forced to pay a day's union wages every time
one of its trucks entered the limits of any city.
Third, Congress believes in the policy that labor and employer should
be on a parity for free and gentlemanly bargaining, as shown by section
1 of the NLRA. It is not intended that either group shall crack the
tyrannical whip over the other.2 1 On this hypothesis, for union opera-
tives to fortify themselves on the public highway and suddenly assault
passing truck drivers, and demand wages for driving the trucks thus
taken over, is obviously nothing short of racketeering. It is certainly
not settlement of labor disputes by parity bargaining.
Still a fourth idea that should be stressed is the quite obvious fact
that labor as a whole is not benefited by most of this pernicious racket-
eering which certain unions are carrying on. For when the electricians
at the New York World's Fair demanded that all electrical equipment
used be wired and assembled at the Fair grounds rather than in the
home state or factory,22 the New York electricians were simply depriv-
ing other electricians throughout the country of work.23 When certain
20 United States v. Classic, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 867 (1941).
(For discussion of this case, see case comment, page 93, supra); Braffith v.
People, 26 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Chapman v. Lake, 112 Fla. 746,
151 So. 399 (1932) ; State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 96 Mont. 608, 32 P. (2d) 15
(1934); People v. Clark, 242 N. Y. 313, 151 N. E. 631 (1926); Thomas v.
State, 40 Okla. Crim. Rep. 204, 267 Pac. 1040 (1928); Wilson v. State, 26
Ohio App. 7, 159 N. E. 585 (1927).
21In Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d)
857 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 513
(1940), involving a place of business being picketed because employees them-
selves unanimously preferred to remain non-union, Justice Shaw said, "The right
of one group to organize for the advancement of its own ends is exactly equal
to but no greater than the right of other citizens peaceably to pursue their own
lawful occupations."
22 Stanley High, Labor in the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
23 The state of Nevada, according to the authority cited above, withdrew from
the Fair partially because the local electricians' union demanded that its gigantic
electrically operated model of Boulder Dam should be rewired by the locals-
which would have involved wrecking the costly model almost entirely.
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musicians' unions fight against non-local musicians performing in their
"territory", 24 musicians in general are the principal sufferers. When
certain unions in Belleville, Illinois and in Cleveland, Ohio, prevent
the use of prefabricated materials, 25 factory workers in general suffer.
The same is true when plumbers in Washington refuse to use pipe
threaded at the factory; and when a Chicago buildings trade council
prohibits the use of stone polished at the quarry in Indiana.2 6 Congress
has granted labor some very strong weapons. Section 1 of the NLRA,
supra, shows that these weapons were intended to be used in removing
labor from the inequitable domination of employers to which it had for
centuries been subjected. There was never any intention that a few
labor groups should turn these weapons upon their fellow workers, and
exploit labor in general for their mere individual gain.
Finally, there is nothing in the wording of the Anti-Racketeering
Act itself that would preclude its use in cleaning up this problem.
At the end of section (d) of the Act is a proviso that "no court of the
United States shall construe or apply any of the provisions of sections
(a) to (e) of this act in such manner as to impair, 6iminish, or in any
manner affect the rights of bona fide labor organizations in lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed
in existing statutes of the United States." However, this would not
prevent using the Act against racketeering unions. The rights of labor
unions as expressed in the existing federal statutes have been sketched
above, and it was seen that nothing therein makes illegal the practices
of "labor's hidden hold-up men". But it is equally obvious, that none
of the labor legislation makes these practices legal. Labor union racket-
eering has apparently not been considered by Congress, except in the
Anti-Racketeering Act. There have been some suggestions that section
7 of the NLRA, which reads, "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or
other mutual aid or protection," would legalize the actions of the New
York truckers' union.27 It is believed that Congress intended by this
section to list certain broad purposes for which labor unions were em-
powered to strive. It is inherent in this provision that only legal means
of obtaining these purposes shall be used. It is believed, as pointed out,
that the methods of the racketeering unions are not legal means of ob-
taining the purposes of collective bargaining, mutual aid, and protection.
, Stanley High, Labor in the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
" Thurman Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.
20 Ibid.7 Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 1400.
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Therefore it is submitted that section 7 of the NLRA would not preclude
the use of the Anti-Racketeering Act against racketeering unions.
For these various reasons it is believed that the appeal of the prin-
cipal case now pending before the United States Supreme Court28
may be successful. However, in the event that a reversal of this de-
cision is not obtained, it is submitted that Congress should amend the
Anti-Racketeering Act, perhaps by tacking a proviso onto the proviso
to section (d), supra, which might read, "provided further, that noth-
ing in this proviso, or anywhere else in this act, shall be construed as
exempting any labor organization from the terms of this act when such
organization is using or attempting to use or threatening to use coercion
for the purpose of obtaining anyone's consent to the taking of his
valuable considerations or other properties and rights as set out in sec-
tions (a) and (b) of this act, or for the purpose of taking such con-
siderations, properties, and rights without the owner's consent."
MILTON SHORT.
Public Officials-Liability for Breach of Statutory Duty
In an action by a town against all members of its board of alder-
men, with the exception of the mayor, the complaint alleged that the
mayor, as tax collector and waterworks superintendent, had been able
to embezzle funds of the town because of the negligent breach of stat-
utory duties on the part of the aldermen; i.e., to require a bond of the
mayor and periodic accountings by him. However, since neither a
corrupt or malicious motive nor any statutory provision for personal
liability was alleged, a 'demurrer to the complaint was sustained and later
affirmed on appeal.' In a companion case, by the same town against
the same aldermen, with the exception of one of their number whom
they had elected chief of police during the time he was serving as alder-
man, the complaint alleged the violation of a statute forbidding a public
officer to hold more than one office, and a consequent loss to the town
in the amount of the salary paid to the chief of police. Likewise, de-
murrer to this complaint was sustained and later affirmed because of
the failure of the complaint to allege corrupt motive or a statutory
provision for liability.2 Thus in both of these civil actions against
public officers for negligent breach of non-discretionary duties, the court
takes the view that a corrupt motive or a statutory provision for liability
is necessary to the statement of a cause of action.
These cases involve breaches of duty by public officers. The courts
of this state have had occasion to consider these basic facts in several
" Announcement of the granting of this certiorari was made October 13, 1941.
'Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S. E. (2d) 423 (1941).
'Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 245, 13 S. E. (2d) 426 (1941).
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